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If a segregationist impulse was to be found in early.Durban, it was directed more against Indians than Africans. As Swanson has shown, in the late nineteenth century Indians competed with whites for 'space, place, trade'. The local state's response was patterned on a threefold approach: 'residential segregation, political exclusion, and commercial suppression'.l7 The first failed to materialize as a scheme for an Indian location fell through. The third objective was more successfully attained, through the 1897 Licensing Act which gave municipalities arbitrary powers to issue or withhold trading licenses.
The local state in Durban was more concerned about controlling than segregating its African population. By its very nature the town's casual, or 'togt', labour force possessed a great deal of freedom and mobility. Regulations requiring 'togt' workers to register were first introduced in 1874. These were tightened in 1903, doubling the monthly registration fee to five shillings and compelling 'togt' workers to live in municipal or private compounds.18 By 1921 about 13,500 African workers (out of Durban's total African population of about 37,500) lived in such accommodation. Another 9,000 domestic workers, predominantly male, lived on their employers' premises, while about 15,000 Africans were without any formal accommodation.l9 In 1904 the Natal Parliament had passed a Native Locations Act, enabling municipalities to establish segregated locations. But Durban did not follow the example of Cape Town in constructing such a location, except to build, rather belatedly in 1915-16, Baumannville, a small location comprising a mere 120 'cottages' for family occupation.
More significant in Durban's case was the development of a local bureaucratic structure of control. The key to this structure was the revenue derived from the municipal monopoly of the manufacture and sale of sorghum beer for African consumption. Such were the profits from this monopoly that the local state was able to finance the creation in 1916 of its own Native Administration Department, which would exercise increasing control over Durban's African population.
Of the four towns that we have examined, Kimberley may have had the tightest form of labour control, in the shape of the closed compounds, but Durban had the most developed form of administrative control over its African population. Indeed, many of the practices that were evolving in Durban were to be borrowed by other municipalities or incorporated in subsequent parliamentary legislation. If one is seeking to discover the The particularity of the practices and structures that evolved in Durban reflected the relatively high degree of municipal autonomy that existed during this early phase. Intervention by the colonial state, or later by the central or provincial state, was minimal. Local administrative systems and housing policies therefore tended to be diverse, and were to a large extent shaped by the nature of the local economy. In Kimberley and Johannesburg housing policy, with its emphasis on the compound system, was partly determined by mining capital. In the ports of Cape Town and Durban the pools of seasonal and casual labour were less easily controllable, although in both towns attempts at control were made through the establishment of compound-type accommodation. But in all four towns, apart from the compounds housing workers at the mines, docks, factories and commercial businesses, there was no developed policy or system for housing the urban black population. The segregated townships, which were to become such a prominent feature of the South African landscape later in the twentieth century, were few in number during this early phase. One peculiar feature of the few municipal townships that had been built was their siting. As the 1914 Tuberculosis Commission noted, sites were often illchosen, 'generally . . . not far from the town sanitary tip, the refuse dump, and slaughter poles . . .X20 Kliptown, Western Native Township and Eastern Native Township in Johannesburg were just three examples of townships located next to sewage farms.2l
Generally, though, these few townships accommodated only a small proportion of Africans who lived outside the compounds. Many lived in private leasehold or freehold townships; others rented backyard quarters in central areas of the town. The degree of control exercised over their lives by the local state was small compared with the tight restrictions that were to come later. The relative absence of control (outside the compounds) in this early phase partly reflected the limited size of the urban African population at the time. However, from the 1920s the picture was to change significantly. 
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AFRICAN AFFAIRS these trends, there was a dramatic growth in the size of the urban African population. And fourth, the central state increasingly intervened in the sphere of urban policy and practice. All of these developments were to have significant implications for urban Africans.
A variety of factors encouraged the growth of manufacturing industry in these three decades: the stimulus of two world wars, state protectionist policies, the diversification of mining capital, and an influx of foreign capital. Between 1921 and 1959-60 there was a doubling of secondary industry's relative contribution to the gross national product. Employment in the manufacturing sector as a whole grew at an average rate of 5 3 per cent per arlnum between 1925 and 1939, and at a rate of 6 0 per cent for Africans. Accompanying this growth was a shift in the labour process . Mechanization increased the number of semi-skilled operative jobs, many of which were filled by African workers. This trend not only altered the old division between skilled white and unskilled African workers, but also affected local and central state policies for administering and controlling urban Africans.22
Contemporary observers gained a strong impression that the economies of the African reserves were deteriorating drastically. The report of the 193(}32 Native Economic Commission, for instance, drew attention to the 'under-development of the Reserves'.23 A rather less drastic picture has been painted by Simkins, who argues that between 1918 and 1954 the reserves went through a period of 'fragile productivity maintenance'. However, he goes on to say, this was not a case ofthe reserve economies being buoyant, but rather a case of an unstable equilibrium being made possible by massive outmigration which limited overcrowding in the reserves. 24 There is evidence of considerable outmigration from the reserves to urban areas. 
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the process of African urbanization. It also provided a framework and foundation upon which subsequent legislation and policy were to be built. The key elements of later, more refined, urban apartheid practice were to be found in the 1923 Act in embryonic form. These included the principle of segregation and the ensuing practice of relocation that arose out of that principle; influx control mechanisms; a self-financing system which shifted as far as possible the burden of reproduction costs on to urban Africans themselves; and an institution for coopting potential collaborators in the shape of the advisory board. During the following decades all of these mechanisms were to be tightened and refined, and the process of central state encroachment on municipal autonomy was to gain ground.
The tightening of control and the process of centralisation were both taken further in the 1937 Native Laws Amendment Act. The major concern of this measure was influx control. It provided for the removal to rural areas of Africans suplus to labour requirements in any particular urban area; it made it more difficult for African women to enter an urban area and for work-seekers to remain in an urban area. The Act increased the influx control and expulsion powers of local authorities, but it also increased the powers of the Minister of Native Affairs, who could now compel a local authority to implement any section of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act or have the section implemented by his own department.34
The 1944 Housing Amendment Act set up the National Housing and Planning Commission. This body was to have powers to intervene in local housing policy, further weakening municipal autonomy.35 And the following year an act was passed to consolidate legislation governing urban Africans. Influx control mechanisms were strengthened, and the central state's powers of intervention were further enhanced. So, by the time that the National Party came to power in 1948, a whole apparatus for regulating and controlling the movement and daily lives of urban Africans had already been constructed. However, while the machinery had been created, it was not yet well-oiled or functioning as efficiently as it was designed to. It was in our next phase that this optimal cfficiency was to come closer to being achieved.
The third phase
During the third phase, from the early 1950s until the late 1970s, there was an intensification of the patterns that had evolved in the second phase. In In the 1950s and 1960s construction of such townships in many urban areas proceeded on a considerable scale. From the late 1 960s the provision of housing in urban areas outside the bantustans was slowed down as the state looked to ways of confining as many Africans as possible within the bantustans, without upsetting the labour supply. Two main strategies were devised. In cases where industrial centres were close to bantustans, townships would be relocated in the bantustans and the workers would commute daily to their workplaces. The other strategy was to try to induce industries themselves to relocate to border areas close to bantustans.43 These strategies were to represent a last attempt to implement the ultimate aim of Stallard and later apartheid planners, namely to allow Africans into urban areas outside the bantustans only for the purpose of selling their labour.
Overwhelmed by contradictions and crises the state has since been forced to abandon this objective. The contradictions inherent in the whole urban system of control gradually became more unmanageable from the early 1970s. And other developing crises further undermined the apparatus of urban apartheid. The continuing collapse of the bantustan economies seriously weakened the base of the migrant labour system. Apartheid barriers like job reservation and influx control aggravated the growing shortage of skilled and semi-skilled labour in urban areas. And, most significant of all, black workers and urban black communities in the 1970s mobilized and organized themselves with greater vigour and militancy than ever before. The 1973 strikes and the 1976 uprising were probably the key events leading to the eventual near collapse of the main pillars of urban apartheid in the 1980s. That collapse will be examined later. Before that it is necessary to analyse more closely those longstanding strains and contradictions that prevented the system, as idealized by Stallard and Sauer, from ever becoming fully workable.
Contradictions and crises in urban apartheid
The Implementation of these policies was to be problematic. Both the quantity and quality of labour demanded by different capitalist sectors could change over time, both in the short term and the long term, complicating the task of channelling labour. Moreover the measures and mechanisms of channelling labour were often ignored or defied by the people over whom control was being sought. Nor could these control measures do anything to stall the process of African rural impoverishment which was a significant factor in determining the movement of people to urban areas.
As the size of the permanent African urban proletariat grew, so did the cost of reproducing that proletariat become more of an issue. The provision of accommodation and transport facilities for urban Africans became a financial burden. The question of who should be primarily responsible for bearing this burden gave rise to struggles and conflicts between capital and labour, between the state and capital, between the local state and central state, and between Africans and the state. These divisions invariably arose out of efforts to shift the burden of reproduction costs from one to the other.
There is a great danger in slipping into a teleological and functionalist interpretation of the evolution of urban apartheid, tracing the gradual development of a monolithic, smoothly functioning system of control. (Indeed, the first half of this article, taken by itself, might seem to fall into that trap.) Although urban apartheid might have taken on a monolithi appearance in the 1960s, it was always riddled with contradictions. As Cooper has noted, '[t]he ambivalence and inconsistency that run through the history of urban policy reflect the complexity of the issue of social reproduction'.44 It remains for us to examine these contradictions, inconsistencies and complexities.
They are to be found, for instance, in one of the key elements of urban apartheid, the pass system. As Hindson has shown, the main function of pass controls has changed over time. From the late nineteenth century they were used to maintain the migrant labour system; after the Second World War the controls were geared to the growth of an urban African proletariat; later the controls were aimed at limiting the size of the 'surplus' propulation in urban areas.45 But at no time-did the pass system have a single function; 
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its purposes were always varied. It has been designed primarily to control the movement of Africans into urban areas, and to channel workers into those sectors where their labour has been most needed. The system has also been used for curbing crime, identifying political activists, and assisting tax collection. 46 The pass system represented a major interverltion in the labour market. It has been argued that the chief purpose of influx control was to perpetuate migrant labour. But Hindson shows that this is a misleading view: influx control was aimed at producing a system of 'differentiated labour-power', in that it simultaneously enforced temporary migration and promoted the stabilization of a permanent urban African proletariat.47
Influx control was a key mechanism for trying to cope with that fundamental contradiction stated at the outset: the need to secure a suitable supply of labour while minimizing the presence of Africans in urban areas. It was a contradictory objective, calling for both the inclusion and exclusion of urban Africans.48 And the functionality of the system was always limited. Although the apparatus of pass control was adapted from time to time in response to shifting demographic patterns or changing labour demand, it was often unable to cope with short-term or seasonal fluctuations in labour demand.
There wasr though, a much more fundamental contradiction. The whole system of influx control came to be inherently unstable, particularly in its later phase. From the 1 950s a vicious cycle developed. The increasing displacement of the 'surplus' urbarl population to the reserves/bantustans aggravated overcrowding and rural impoverishment in those rural areas. This in turn put pressure on people to defy influx control by moving to urban areas, where there was a better chance of earning a subsistence. As Greenberg has put it, 'control has made necessary more controls; the successful damming up of labour [sic] in the African rural areas has created inducements to burst the dams'.49 Although influx control has limited the growth of the urban African population, especially during the 1960s, it has never been able to achieve an optimal limitatioru on growth. Africans constantly violated influx control by moving where they wanted to go. The vast number of pass law prosecutions is a measure of this . And the more the controls were violated, the more costly it became to maintain the machinery of control, in Greenberg's words again, 'the greatly expanded coterie of clerks, managers, magistrates, inspectors and police'.50 The ultimate 
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tendeney was for the whole system to break down, a tendeney that will be examined in the final seetion of this artiele.
Attempting to eontrol the movement of Afrieans has been one key element in the apartheid system. Another has been to exereise tight eontrol over the daily lives of Afrieans in urban areas, while at the same time ensuring the reproduetion of the labour foree. Both of these objeetives were to be served at minimal eost to the state and to eapital. But again efforts to realize these aims were to give rise to further eontradietions and eonfliets. In partieular the imperative towards eontrol was often eontradietory to the eost At the eentre of this eontradietion was the whole housing question. The maintenanee of eontrol was elosely linked to the nature of the aeeommodation provided for urban Afrieans; and housing represented the major component of reproduetion eosts. Moreover the whole debate about whether to opt for a migrant or a stabilized labour foree the Stallard/ Fagan/Sauer dabate had signifieant implieations for Afriean housing. As we have seen, migraney and stabilization were not stark alternatives; a eombination of the two produeed a system of differentiated labour-power. And differentiated labour-power neeessitated a poliey of differentiated housing. Although it was never fully realized, the aim was to aceommodate migrants in compounds or hostels, and stabilizedfamilies in formal townships.
Another eontradietion hinged around the question of where aeeommodation for urban Afrieans should be sited. Many employers preferred to aeeommodate their workers elose to the workplaee in eompounds. Workers were kept under tighter eontrol; they were more immediately available; and eliminating the need for transport to the workplaee redueed reproduetion eosts. In some eases, as we have seen, eompounds were not just preferred by employers, but deemed to be an absolute neeessity. This was the ease at the Kimberley diamond mines and Rand gold mines. It was also to a lesser extent true for the Cape Town and Durban doeks where shortterm fluetuations in labour demand necessitated having the work-foree living elose at hand. However, eompounds and hostels, whieh were often located in eentral areas of cities, seemed to pose problems of soeial and politieal control. It was also in the early 1950s that the state attempted to shift more of this eost burden on to capital. An earlier effort to do this had failed. The 1937 Native Laws Amendment Act had permitted municipalities to eompel employers to aeeommodate their blaek workers.62 However, the implieation of this would have been more eentrally sited eompounds and hostels, eonflieting with the segregationist imperative. So the strategy subsequently developed in the early 1 950s was not to eompel employers to provide aeeommodation for black workers, but to make a direct finaneial eontribution towards reproduetion eosts. This was the prineiple embodied in the 1952 Native Serviees Levy Aet. This measure obliged employers in cighteen major urban areas to pay to the loeal authority 2s.6d. for every six days worked by an adult male Afriean; employers of domestie workers and employers who aecommodated their own workers were exempted. These eontributions would be paid into loeal native revenue aeeounts and be used to finance housing and serviees.63 More recently the same principle of employer levies has come to be embodied in the emerging system of regional services councils.
In this examination of the long-standing struggle between the central state, local state and capital to shift the burden of reproduction costs on to each other, one important point has been obscured. That is that urban Africans themselves bore the major part of this cost burden. The crucial mechanism here was the self-financing system of natis e revenue accounts. Durban was a pioneer in this system, instituting a native revenue account in 1908. The system came to be formalized at a national level by the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act. Native revenue accounts were sub-accounts of general borough accounts. Accruing to them were rents paid by African tenants in municipal housing, revenue from municipal beer sales, and other fees paid by Africans. This money was to be spent on administration, the provision of services, and housing for Africans. Although native revenue accounts often derived a substantial income, it was never sufficient by itself to ensure the requisite provision of housing for Africans; hence the massive housing shortage that had developed by the late 1 940s.
Given this weak financial base, along with the unwillingness of the central state, local state or capital to bear the cost burden, thousands of urban Africans were forced to devise their own forms of shelter. By the 1940s vast shack settlements had emerged around many of South Africa's urban areas.64 Inherent in the growth of these settlements were further contradictions. On the one hand they relieved the central state, local state and capital of the considerable financial burden that would have been involved in providing more formal housing for shack-dwellers. On the other hand, the shack settlements were zones that largely fell beyond the control of the local state. The settlements, lacking basic water and sanitary services, were considered to be health hazards. And they were deemed to be havens for criminals and political activists. Although more research is required into the social history of squatter communities before we can obtain a clearer picture, there is little doubt that their existence seriously weakened local state control over urban Africans. The state itself was well aware of this; hence there followed the massive programme of urban removals and relocation that began in the 1950s.
As we have seen, the exercise of control over urban Africans involved costs, which the various parties wanting control were generally unwilling to bear. This was one of the major contradictions in the urban apartheid system. Moreover, control not only involved large financial costs; it also generated resistance, giving rise to further contradictions.
Urban struggles have many facets. As Cooper has put it,
